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TO DEFAULT OR NOT TO
DEFAULT?
DANIEL GROS* AND THOMAS MAYER**
This is indeed the question facing Greece and the
European Union at present. One of the founding
principles of EMU had been from the beginning the
‘no-bailout’ principle enshrined in the Treaty of
Maastricht. Article 125 states clearly that neither
member states nor the EU guarantees the public debt
of any individual member state. This does not impede
member states to grant each other assistance, but it is
clear that in the ultimate instance national debt
remains a national responsibility.
In April 2010 the member states of the eurozone
decided to effectively ‘bail out’ Greece because they
feared a collapse of financial markets if Greece 
had suddenly become insolvent and because they
hoped that the tough measures agreed with the
Greek government in exchange of the 110 billion
euro EU/ECB/IMF programme could turn the coun-
try around. One year later the hope has largely evap-
orated as Greece has been unable to achieve the 
targets. It is becoming ever more apparent that the
country, in the best of circumstances, would need
years to transform itself to the point where it would
be able to service its mounting public and exter-
nal debts. To paraphrase a 2010 IMF Staff Posi-
tion Note, such a restructuring, however ‘un-
desirable’, seems ultimately ‘unavoidable’ (Cottarelli
et al. 2010).
However, the fear of a financial market meltdown in
case of default remains. This fear seems to dominate
policy makers’ thinking, leaving them to provide the
country with ever more public financing. In this con-
tribution we therefore discuss whether the conse-
quences of default have to be as dramatic as some
claim (see, for example, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi,
Financial Times of 30 May).
We conclude that a debt restructuring in the context
of a multilateral agreement among creditors, the
debtor and EU institutions should be manageable. A
‘second Lehman’ is not the unavoidable consequence
of a default, at least for Greece. Moreover, the low
market price of Greek debt provides a way to avoid
an outright default but still provide meaningful debt
relief.
Introduction
Most EU officials and most government officials of
EMU countries ‘officially’ reject any suggestion for a
restructuring of the debt of Greece (not to speak of
Ireland or Portugal). However, an increasing number
of them seem to admit in private conversations or in
background comments to the press that such a mea-
sure may eventually be unavoidable for at least one of
these countries.
The arguments ‘why’ are by now well known: Greece,
in particular, is unlikely to generate a sufficiently large
primary surplus any time soon that would restore
market confidence in its solvency and thus reduce its
borrowing rates to levels consistent with socially
acceptable debt service payments. But without market
access, Greece (and other countries) will have to rely
on continuing official support to refinance maturing
debt. Rising financial exposure to the troubled coun-
tries will raise political resistance against further
financial help in the countries granting the assistance,
and continuing pressure for ever more austerity
demanded in return for external assistance will raise
political opposition against adjustment policies in the
troubled countries themselves. In the end, political
grass root rebellion, which has already started on both
ends of the spectrum (‘true Fins’ and the ‘indignants’
on the streets of Athens) will enforce an end to either
austerity or financial assistance and will thus trigger a
debt restructuring.
Officials seem to realise that the road they are now
pursuing leads to trouble. Should private lenders be
‘bought out’ completely by open-ended official fund-
ing of the troubled countries’ borrowing needs, an
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future. Private investors could rely on public sector
bailouts, even if they funded insolvent sovereign
entities. The resulting ‘moral hazard’ would perpetu-
ate excessive lending to profligate governments with-
in EMU.
Those warning against a restructuring often make the
following points:
1. A debt restructuring will be too costly for the com-
munity of EMU countries.
2. A debt restructuring is no substitute for the com-
prehensive economic adjustment required in the
troubled countries.
3. Countries whose debt has been restructured will
lose market access for a very long time.
4. A debt restructuring will create moral hazard for
the EMU sovereigns and induce new over-borrow-
ing in the future.
5. A debt restructuring of one country will lead to
contagion of other countries and perpetuate the
euro debt crisis.
We now turn to a more detailed examination of these
five arguments. We concentrate on the case of Greece
which represents the most acute situation, but we will
not neglect other two GIP countries (Ireland and
Portugal) currently receiving financial assistance.
A debt restructuring will be too costly for the communi-
ty of EMU countries
The total public debt outstanding of GIP countries at
the end of last year amounted to 624 billion euros, a
sizeable amount but not very large relative to the
total GDP of the euro area (6 percent). Greece alone
accounts for about one half on this, or about 3 per-
cent of euro area GDP. Table 1 shows the holdings of
Greek public debt by lender. Apart from other for-
eign investors (which range from pension to hedge
funds), the largest creditors were domestic banks, fol-
lowed by foreign banks and official institutions (EU,
ECB and IMF). 
The item ‘Other foreign investors’ in Table 1, which
includes hedge funds, should be able to absorb losses,
since they are typically much less leveraged and more
diversified. Of most concern is the exposure of the
banking sector. Among foreign banks, banks in
Germany and France have the biggest exposure to
GIP countries (about 30 billion euros each). Again,
these amounts are significant but not very large rela-
tive to the size of these economies. Exposure is con-
centrated on Greece. According to last year’s CEBS
(Committee of European Banking Supervisors) bank
stress test, exposure to this country amounted to
12 percent of the Tier 1 capital of German banks
(with exposure concentrated on Hypo Real Estate and
the Landesbanken) and 6 percent of the Tier 1 capital
of French banks. The stress test also showed consid-
erable exposure of banks in Belgium (14 percent of
Tier 1 capital) and Portugal (9 percent of Tier 1 capi-
tal) to the Greek government. Only part of the debt
held by banks has been marked to market.
The single biggest exposure to the troubled countries
is that of the ECB. The European Central Bank has
bought bonds of these governments in the amount of
about 74 billion euros and has lent the banks in these
countries 319 billion euros against collateral of vary-
ing quality (Table 2). A 25 percent loss on the ECB’s
exposure to Greece (which would seem possible in the
case of a 50 percent haircut on Greek debt and an
existing 25 percent mark-down from face value for the
assets held by the ECB) could cost the ECB almost
half its capital (of about 80 billion euros). This loss
would of course be dramatically reduced if in an
orderly debt restructuring the Greek banking sector
would be stabilised so that it could honour its obliga-
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Table 1  
Classification of Greek public debt by lender (in billion euros) 
 2009  2010  2011  (forecast) 
Total public debt 
   of which 
Domestic banks 
Foreign banks 
National central bank 
Other domestic investors 
Other foreign investors 
EU/IMF assistance 
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tions to the ECB. In this case, the ECB would only be
affected by its direct exposure through the securities
markets programme: SMP (and could lose 12 billion
euros or 15 percent of its equity in our example).
All in all, we conclude that a debt restructuring of one
of the troubled countries would not overburden the
euro area economy. A 50 percent haircut of the out-
standing debt of Greece (as suggested by many ana-
lysts) would cause lenders losses of about 170 billion
euros. However, these losses would be distributed
unevenly – with the Greek domestic banks and the
ECB probably hit hardest – and some support by the
stronger euro area governments (in the form of capi-
tal injections into weak commercial banks and the
ECB) to avoid risks to the euro area financial system
would probably be needed.
A debt restructuring is no substitute for the compre-
hensive economic adjustment required in the troubled
countries
To be sure, debt restructuring would be no substitute
for the comprehensive adjustment the troubled coun-
tries have to go through to achieve a primary surplus
and restore growth. At the same time, debt restructur-
ing would not eliminate the pressure for adjustment as
market access could only be regained when budget
balance and growth have been restored. But adjust-
ment may be socially more acceptable when it does
not involve the creation of high primary surpluses to
pay off creditors, especially when the latter mostly
reside abroad.
Sometimes it has also been argued that restructuring
should come as a ‘reward’ when a country has
achieved primary balance. Hence, as long as the pri-
mary balance remains in deficit, a restructuring should
be avoided. However, with restructuring cutting the
country off from new funding, the primary budget
would be forced to balance immediately. Making
restructuring conditional on the prior achievement of
primary budget balance raises disincentives for timely
adjustment for both the borrower and its lenders. They
can rely on external funding the longer they delay the
achievement of budget balance.
Countries whose debt has been restructured will lose
market access for a very long time
The argument that countries whose debt has been
restructured would lose market access for a long time
cannot be dismissed easily. However, if the troubled
countries were to reduce their debt ratios to levels
more acceptable to investors, they would also be net
payers to the market for a long time. The adjustment
programme for Greece, for instance, envisages large
primary budget surpluses beyond the year 2020. Thus,
Greece is expected to refrain from new net borrowing
for at least as long as countries that defaulted on their
debt were cut off from market access. For instance,
Russia, which defaulted in 1998, returned to the inter-
national market again in 2010. The form of a restruc-
turing also determines the duration of forced market
abstinence. An orderly process with active participa-
tion of creditors can help a country to return to the
market sooner rather than later.
A debt restructuring will create moral hazard for the
EMU sovereigns and induce new over-borrowing in
the future
This argument contradicts the previous argument
that a restructuring would cut off countries from
market access for a long time. It also opposes the ear-
lier argument that continuous bailouts would create
moral hazard among lenders. More importantly, it
ignores the effects of debt restructuring on lenders.
The excessive build-up of debt in some EMU coun-
tries was only possible because lenders assumed that
a country within the EMU could not become insol-
vent. If private sector lenders were now shielded by
bailouts with public sector money, their expectations
would be confirmed and the stage would be set for
reckless lending in the future. In fact, exposing
lenders to default risks is probably the best way to
Table 2  
The ECB’s exposure to GIP countries (in nominal billion euros, end 2010–early 2011) 
 Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Total 
SMP (securities markets programme) 
Liquidity 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) of the 






















Sources: ECB; DB Global Markets Research. impose discipline on borrowers. Hence, the pricing of
default risks by the market and the resulting risk pre-
miums on government bond yields would seem to be
a much better instrument to punish countries for run-
ning unsound fiscal policies than the penalty system
embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact. This
applies in particular to banks, for which the risk
weight attached to sovereign lending in the euro area
is still zero. A restructuring would induce in particu-
lar banks to avoid accumulating too much sovereign
exposure and would thus make a future sovereign
debt crisis less virulent.
A debt restructuring of one country will lead to conta-
gion of other countries and perpetuate the euro debt
crisis
When the debt crisis erupted in Greece towards the
end of 2009, markets quickly demanded higher risk
premia on government bond yields of EMU countries
with high deficit or debt ratios. In early May, markets
even started to doubt the survival of EMU itself.
Since then, policy makers have shown an impressive
determination to defend EMU and have taken steps
that appeared entirely impossible only two years ago.
As a result, markets have regained confidence in the
continuing existence of EMU and focussed on the
economic fundamentals of individual countries. As a
result of this and determined efforts by the govern-
ment to rein in fiscal deficits, stabilise the banking sec-
tor and support growth through supply-side reforms,
Spain has been able to regain the confidence of the
markets. Similarly Italy and Belgium, which have very
high debt ratios but have a sounder banking sector or
followed more prudent fiscal policies than the trou-
bled countries, have also been able to contain the risk
premia on their government bond yields.
Debt restructuring in one of the troubled countries
without doubt will induce a renewed widening of
bond yield spreads of other countries with high debt
or deficits. However, outside of the group of troubled
countries, this is unlikely to lead to a cut-off of sover-
eign borrowers from market financing. More likely is
that markets will continue to assess countries on the
basis of their fundamentals. This may well lead them
to expect a debt restructuring in Portugal when
restructuring occurs in Greece, and it may induce
them to price in a higher risk of restructuring in
Ireland, but it is unlikely that they will expect the
same to occur in Spain, Belgium or Italy. Moreover,
the more information the authorities disseminate
about the exposure of banks and other systemically
important financial institutions to troubled countries
and the better they prepare a recapitalisation where
needed, the lower is the risk of contagion within the
financial sector when a restructuring occurs.
Comparisons with the reaction of financial markets
after the Lehman bankruptcy seem completely
unwarranted. When it went bankrupt, Lehman had
literally hundreds of thousands of derivatives con-
tracts outstanding in practically every major financial
institution in Europe. The Government of Greece, by
contrast, is not the counterparty to significant
amounts of financial contracts and the total net
amount of CDS (credit default swap) contracts on
Greek government debt outstanding is well known
and amounts to less than 5 billion euros. Moreover,
the senior debt of Lehman traded at a rather low dis-
count until about a week before its collapse, which
came as a surprise. The difficulties of the Greek gov-
ernment have been known now for more than a year
and the market discounts on Greek debt indicate that
the market is anyway expecting a default with a rather
high probability.
Thus, it would seem to us unconvincing to reject a debt
restructuring for, say, Greece, when all other argu-
ments are in favour merely on the grounds that this
would indiscriminately affect a larger number of other
euro area countries or financial institutions. Rather
than preventing necessary restructuring in an insolvent
country it would seem better to prepare for it by estab-
lishing an orderly process, creating the best possible
transparency on financial exposure, and pursuing con-
vincing adjustment policies in other countries.
Conclusions
Our discussion of debt restructuring for the countries
under the euro safety umbrella has shown that this
may well be costly for individual entities (especially
domestic commercial banks and the ECB), but can be
digested by the private and public sector in the euro
area at large if an orderly process and a high degree of
transparency are established. Hence, it would seem to
us dangerous to preclude such a debt restructuring
under any circumstance. Such protection may well
come at the cost of undermining the political basis for
the EMU in both, countries giving and receiving
assistance.
Public sector involvement in a debt restructuring is of
course needed to prevent the failure of the entities
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most exposed to losses from bringing down the entire
financial system of the euro area. Public assistance for
recapitalisation would probably have to focus on the
banking sector in the affected country, the ECB, and
euro area commercial banks heavily exposed to a loss
of claims associated with restructuring. More gener-
ally, public sector involvement can help rebuild trust
between creditors and debtors when such trust has
been impaired by a default. 
Moreover, the present low price of Greek public debt
offers the chance to implement a market-based
approach to debt reduction: a European institution
(maybe the European Financial Stability Facility –
EFSF) could offer holders of Greek debt an
exchange into EFSF paper at the current market
price. In the context of the ongoing stress tests banks
would be forced to write down holdings in their
banking book and thus have an incentive to accept
the offer. The EFSF could then write down the nom-
inal value of its claims to this amount and agree to
an extension of maturities of its claims on Greece (at
unchanged interest rates), provided that the country
agrees to additional adjustment efforts (and asset
sales). The difference between the refinancing cost of
the EFSF and the interest rate it would earn on its
claims on Greece could be in the order of 100 bps,
thus providing a service fee and some margin for the
remaining risk.
This approach can restore Greece’s access to private
capital markets in the longer run if two conditions
are met: 
￿ the remaining debt level must be sustainable at
interest rates which incorporate a moderate risk
premium, and 
￿ the EFSF claims must not be senior to those of
private bondholders – the EFSF support must be
akin to an injection of equity into the country. This
is the case for the existing loans under the Greek
programme (and EFSF lending in general) but has
been rejected for the new European Stability
Mechanism. While the EFSF would concentrate
on the exchange of the stock of bonds, the IMF
would continue to fund any remaining fiscal
deficits during the adjustment period.
With even shorter-term Greek debt now trading at
close to 60 percent of its face value, our approach
would lead to a sufficiently large reduction of debt at
a reasonable cost for the private bond holders. An
average discount of 40 percent in the bond exchange
would push the debt ratio below 100 percent of GDP
and require bond holders to write off some 140 billion
euros. Close to full participation could be ensured if
the country passes a ‘mopping-up’ law as already pro-
posed by Lee Bucheit last year. Such a law would in
effect create a ‘statutory’ collective action clause valid
for the entire existing debt stock.
The ECB would need to participate in the exchange,
given that it holds about one fifth of the stock of
Greek debt. In order to save face and keep up appear-
ances, the ECB would be offered a special bond with
a very long maturity (say, 15–20 years) and a low
interest rate. This bond would have the same present
value as the EFSF bonds offered to private bond
holders, but would avoid the realization of losses and
the need for a recapitalization of the ECB.
Compared to a mere rescheduling, our approach
would have the advantage of offering a much higher
chance to put an end to the debt crisis. With conta-
gion of countries other than those already under the
umbrella now less of an issue, authorities should uti-
lize this chance.
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